This paper investigates the effects of transaction taxes on depth and bid-ask spread under asymmetric information. The paper uses a static model where a monopolistic market maker faces liquidity and informed traders. Introducing transaction taxes could, surprisingly, lead to increase in depth. Under some distributional assumptions, when market conditions are favorable to the dealer, the spread responds less than proportionally to an increase in the transaction tax while the depth actually increases. In contrast, when market conditions are unfavorable to the dealer, the spread widens more than proportionally and the depth decreases, potentially to zero, in response to an increase in the transaction tax. Our model sheds light on the disagreement in the empirical literature on the relative magnitude of transaction costs on trading volume.
Introduction
This paper investigates the effects of securities transaction taxes (STT) on the liquidity of a quote-driven market under asymmetric information. Academics and Þnancial market regulators (e.g. Dow and Rahi (2000, OECD (2002) , and Hakkio (1994) ) have studied the potential effects of imposing securities transaction taxes (akin to the Tobin tax) as an instrument to curb speculation and excess volatility without impairing market liquidity. Kyle (1985) states that liquidity can be measured by bid-ask spread, depth and resiliency. 1 Past research, however, uses an aggregate measure of liquidity, trading volume, in analysing the relationship between transaction costs and liquidity. In this paper, we examine the effects of taxation on a disaggregate level using bid-ask spread and depth. 2 Consequently, our results can accommodate some of the disagreements in the empirical literature on the relative magnitude of transaction taxes on trading volume (Kandel and Marx (1998) and Brennen, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998)).
Our model builds on Glosten and Milgrom (1985) , who study the pricing strategy of an uninformed market maker facing potentially better informed traders. Our approach, however, differs from Glosten and Milgrom (1985) in the following way. First, they assume the existence of an equilibrium whereas we characterize the conditions for the existence of an equilibrium in our framework. Moreover, as in Dupont (2000), we incorporate both spread and depth into a model that allows the theoretical dealer to adjust the depth differently than the bid-ask spread in response to changes in the degree of information asymmetry.
In this setting, we analyze the effects of transaction tax on market liquidity across different levels of information asymmetry. 1 Resiliency is the speed with which price ßuctuations resulting from trades are dissipated, and depth is the maximum amount the dealer stands ready to sell or buy at the posted prices. See Kyle (1985) for details. 2 Previous research on the relationship between transaction costs and trading volume can be used to study the effects of transaction taxes on liquidity (see among many, Constantinides (1986), Barclay, Kandel and Marx (1998), Vayanos (1998) , and Vayanos andVila (1999)).
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Our analysis uses a one-period model where a monopolistic market maker posts Þrm prices (including tax) and depths on the bid and ask sides, while facing a risk-neutral informed trader and a liquidity trader. The informed trader observes a private signal correlated with the true value of the asset. The demand of the liquidity trader is price sensitive and subject to the liquidity shock.
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, introducing a transaction tax could lead to either increase or decrease in depth, depending on the degree of information asymmetry and liquidity demand. Secondly, the spread could respond disproportionally to increase in tax.
Subsequently, our results seem to point to two regimes as far as transaction tax is concerned.
First, when information asymmetry is weak or liquidity demand is strong (i.e., when market conditions are favorable to the market maker), the market maker pays part of the transaction tax himself by increasing the spread less than the tax. Moreover, he quotes a larger depth to attract order ßow in order to make up for the loss in demand due to the transaction tax. On the other hand, when market conditions are unfavorable, increasing the transaction tax leads to a drastic reduction in the liquidity provided by the market maker, enticing him to exit the market. In turn, the paper suggests that lowering transaction tax may not necessarily lead to increase in quoted depth.
Our paper is structured as follows. The next section introduces the model. To numerically analyze our model under various distributional assumptions, we study two cases. Section 3 analyses the equilibrium conditions under a discrete distribution: the asset value, the informed trader's signal and the liquidity shock each take two values. Section 4 looks at the equilibrium conditions under continuous distributions where the asset value is lognormally distributed with mean 1. Both the private signal and the liquidity shock are, however, normally distributed. 
Model
A monopolistic dealer posts Þrm prices and depths on the bid and ask sides. He faces a pricesensitive liquidity trader and a trader possessing private information about the value of the asset. The liquidity trader's demand is price sensitive and stochastic. The informed trader, who observes a signal correlated with the true value of the asset, buys the asset if the ask is below (or sells if the bid is above) his valuation. For simplicity, we assume no limit-order book or ßoor brokers compete with the dealer (or specialist). The model focuses on asymmetric information and excludes other factors such as misdiversiÞcation and order-processing costs.
To simplify computations, we assume that the informed trader is risk neutral. His demand is satisÞed before that of the liquidity trader. This assumption simpliÞes the informed trader's demand but excludes some strategies potentially available to actual traders, such as conditioning orders on the volume of liquidity trade. Informed and liquidity traders' buy or sell orders are lumped together and passed on to the dealer so that the quantity limit becomes binding if the sum of all orders is greater than the posted depth.
We study only the ask side of the dealer's activity as the bid side is symmetrical. Let x be the true value of the asset, c the transaction tax, a the ask price inclusive of tax, z the quantity 
where I the indicator function. Consequently, the dealer's net and expected proÞt are
3 If the informed trader is risk averse then his demand remains Þnite. 
Equilibrium with discrete distributions
Let x and G take the values 1 or −1 and η take the valuesη or −η with probability Table 3 .1 summarizes the results.
1. The market maker can exclude the informed trader by setting the selling price above the latter's maximum valuation; a ≥v. By having no informed trader, the dealer imposes no quantity limit, z. In this case, the market maker is a monopolist facing a downward sloping curve and his expected proÞt is
The proÞt-maximizing price, (c +η)/2 is the listed price provided this price is abovev and the maximum value for the proÞt is
To summarize when a ≥v: the optimal price that excludes the informed trader is max[v, (c +η)/2]; there is no quantity limit; the maximum expected proÞt is
and the maximum amount of tax isη.
2. Alternatively, the market maker can set his selling price belowv in the hope of attracting more demand; 0 < a <v. 4 Naturally, he then runs the risk of being picked by the informed trader. Given a selling price a,η −a is the highest possible liquidity demand. 5 If the dealer set the depth strictly above this level, he would incur extra losses when transacting with the informed without generating extra liquidity trade. Hence, z ·η − a. When the liquidity demand is positive, it is equal to the quantity limit. Consequently, the expected proÞt is:
If a < c +v/3, the optimal z is 0; if a > c +v/3, the optimal z is the maximum quantity limitη − a; if a = c +v/3, z can be set arbitrarily, for example, to zero.
With z =η − a, the expected proÞt function becomes:
The dealer maximizes the function deÞned in Equation and the maximum proÞt is
the constraint a <v is binding; in the limit, the dealer wants to set a =v.
The Þnal step is to compare the maximum expected proÞt when a >v and when a ·v. 
n.a. optimal z n.a. n.a.
0 When a ≥v, imposing a quantity limit is not necessary; the optimal z is undeÞned and "n.a." is entered in the corresponding cell. Whenv > 3 (η − c), the expected proÞt is never positive and the dealer exits the market by setting z to 0; the optimal a is undeÞned and "n.a." is entered in the corresponding cell.
maximum than letting a <v. The optimal price and depth in this case are a * = and z * =η − a * . When (η + c), the optimal price is ν and no quantity limit need be imposed. Whenv ≥ 3(η − c), the depth is set to zero and no price need be quoted.
For expositional purpose, Figure 3 .1 maps the results in Table 3 .1. ¢ , a small increase in the transaction cost pushes up the spread but does not affect the depth 6 , while a larger change may result in the imposition of a Þnite quantity limit but may not translate into a spread increase of equal magnitude. In contrast, when the information asymmetry is more severe,v ∈ ¡ 3 5 , 3 ¢ , and the quantity limits are imposed, an increase in the transaction cost has a proportional effect on the spread.
Equilibrium with continuous distributions
In the following section, we take the asset value, x, to be lognormally distributed. With the lognormal distribution, the demand is d(a) = − log(a) + η and y = log(x). We also assume that the distribution of (x, η, G) is common knowledge with η and G are normally distributed.
Marginal condition
Although no equilibrium closed-form solution exists, the marginal conditions for the price and the quantity limit shed light on the trade-offs governing the dealer's proÞt maximization.
The Þrst derivative of the specialist's expected proÞt with respect to the quantity limit is given in Equation (4.1); the one with respect to the ask price is given in Equation (4.2), where d 0 (a) denotes the slope of the liquidity demand at price a.
(4.2) 6 In fact, the depth in this region is "undeÞned". 7 The derivation of equations (4.1) and (4.2) can be provided upon request. is below a. In this event, the effect on overall demand is proportional to the slope of the liquidity trader's demand.
Expected dealer's profit
We assume that the informed trader is endowed with a negative exponential utility function with risk aversion γ. Equivalently, the informed trader maximizes E[π i |G] − γ var(π i |G)/2, where π i is the informed trader's proÞt and var(π i |G) is the conditional variance of his proÞt given G.
We assume that his initial wealth is conditionally independent of the value of the asset and the liquidity shock. The informed trader chooses the quantity q to maximize
where var(x|G) is the conditional variance of x given G. As the informed trader's orders are
Þlled before those of the liquidity trader, the informed trader's demand function is
. When x is lognormally distributed, this is not linear in v because the conditional variance of x given G depends on the realization of G:
where σ y is the standard deviation of y = log(x) and ρ = corr(G, y).
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Thus, the informed trader's demand is deÞned by
where
Numerical Results
When x is lognormally distributed, we search for the optimal price (or spread) and for the optimal depth numerically. The dealer's proÞt maximization simpliÞes to a one-dimensional problem when the informed trader is risk neutral because the optimal depth in this case can be written as a function of the spread. just before (the off-the-run Treasuries). Bid-ask spreads on coupon Treasury securities have traditionally been about twice as high for off-the-run issues than for comparable on-the-run issues, while quoted depth is lower. Moreover, during the recent bouts of market volatility, bidask spreads have widened and depth has contracted proportionally more for off-the-run than for on-the-run coupon securities. The asymmetric information argument cannot easily account for this fact since the quality of private information should be equal across the two market segments. However, agents trading bonds prefer to trade in the on-the-run securities, therefore creating a stronger liquidity demand in that market. The more fundamental question as to why agents prefer to trade in the on-the-run segment is not addressed here, although self-fulÞlling expectation arguments could be made.
The paper seems to point to two regimes as far as transaction cost is concerned. When market conditions are favorable, the dealer pays part of the transaction cost himself (by increasing the spread less than the cost) and quotes a larger depth to attract order ßow in order to make up for the loss in demand due to the transaction cost. The increase in the depth offsets, albeit partially, the effect on trading volume of the wider spread. When market conditions are unfavorable, increasing the transaction cost leads to a drastic reduction in the liquidity provided by the market maker, enticing him to exit the market.
Although, the implications of the model have been introduced by presenting the effect on the spread and the depth of an increase in the transaction cost, symmetric conclusions hold for a reduction in this cost. As a consequence, a decision to lower taxes on transactions in the hope of improving market liquidity might actually lead to smaller depths and a less-than-proportional reduction in the spreads. This is because, when market conditions are rather favorable to the dealer, a tax-insofar as it is at least partially reßected in the bid and ask prices-reduces the 14 probability of the informed trader's buying at the ask or selling at the bid. This additional protection entices the market maker to quote a larger depth than he would without tax.
Conclusion
The model shows that introducing a transaction tax could affect market liquidity differently depending on the market conditions facing the dealer. If the asset value, the informed trader's signal, and the liquidity shock each take two values, there is an interval for the precision of the private signal for which increasing the transaction tax has no or little effect on the spread (no quantity limit is necessary then). If the asset value is lognormally distributed, the market maker widens the spread by less than the transaction tax and actually increases the depth when the degree of information asymmetry is subdued or liquidity demand is strong. In contrast, when market conditions are unfavorable to the dealer, he increases the spread by more than the transaction tax and reduces the depth. For all distributions, introducing a transaction tax may induce the dealer to exit the market before he would have done so in the absence of a transaction tax. This suggests that a transaction tax could aggravate liquidity loss in periods of market stress.
